Variations in Farm Performance: Evidence from the CEECs and Existing EU Member States by Davidova, Sophia et al.
Variations in Farm Performance: Evidence from the 





















Paper prepared for presentation at the X
th EAAE Congress 
‘Exploring Diversity in the European Agri-Food System’, 




Copyright 2002 by Sophia Davidova, Matthew Gorton, Tomas Ratinger, Katarzyna 
Zawalinska, Belen Iraizoz, Barna Kovács and Tamás Mizo. All rights reserved.  Readers 
may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.  
X EAAE Congress ‘Exploring Diversity in the European Agri-Good System’ 
28
th-31
















Variations in Farm Performance: Evidence from the CEECs and Existing EU 
Member States  
 
Sophia Davidova, Matthew Gorton, Tomas Ratinger, Katarzyna Zawalinska, Belen 
Iraizoz, Barna Kovács and Tamás Mizo
1 
                                                 
1  Sophia Davidova is a senior lecturer at Imperial College at Wye s.davidova@ic.ac.uk.  Matthew Gorton is a 
lecturer in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Food Marketing, University of Newcastle 
matthew.gorton@ncl.ac.uk Belen Iraizoz is a lecturer in the Department of Economics, Universidad Pública de 
Navarra. Tomas Ratinger is a senior researcher at the Institute of Agricultural Economics in Prague. Katarzyna 
Zawaliska is a CASE foundation scholar and a PhD student at the University of Warsaw.  Barna Kovács and Tamás 




Variations in Farm Performance: Evidence from the CEECs 






This paper attempts to shed light on the recent performance of farms in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland and to compare the findings from the CEECs with the EU situation. 
Utilising farm survey data, ratios of agricultural profitability and productivity have been 
estimated and clusters of farms with similar characteristics have been identified.  Analysis 
indicates that the Hungarian farms have the best prospects amongst the analysed accession 
countries according to their profitability.  The poor profitability and structural problems of Polish 
agriculture are highlighted. The family farms are less productive than corporate farms in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary despite the expectations at the outset of the reform that better 
incentives will boost their productivity.   
Keywords: CEECs, farm performance, profitability, cluster analysis. 
 
1 Introduction 
The 1990s witnessed widespread changes in farm structures, government policies and agricultural 
markets in the CEECs that are applicants for EU membership. These changes have resulted in a 
more differentiated set of farming systems that have to deal with the effects of international trade 
liberalisation and, on accession, with the competition in the single European market.   In view of 
future EU enlargement, there has been a growing interest in competitiveness, productivity and 
profitability of farming in the CEECs.  This interest has been stimulated by the desire to 
understand how the CEECs may perform in an enlarged European Union. 
This paper tries, first, to investigate the private profitability and total factor productivity (TFP) of 
farms classified by several variables including size, legal type and agri-environmental region.  
Second, it identifies groups of farms with common characteristics, utilising cluster analysis, to 
better classify and understand variations in performance.  These clusters form the basis of a 
discussion of the overall survivability of different groups of farms with and without direct 
payments (net current subsidies) and, thus, the likelihood of future restructuring.  
The study is focused on the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.  In order to compare the 
findings from the CEECs with the EU situation, similar studies were carried out for two 
contrasting regions in the EU, the region of Navarra in Spain and South-East England.  They 




2 Previous  studies  on  CEEC farm performance  
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Previous studies of farm performance in the CEECs have mainly focused on understanding 
differences in relative efficiency. Gorton and Davidova (2001) drew together several individual 
country studies for CEECs that are part of the enlargement process in order to present a synthesis 
of findings and draw out relevant cross-national patterns. 
The majority of farm efficiency studies for the region have focused on size and structural matters. 
This is unfortunate as studies for other regions have found that farm efficiency is significantly 
related to human and social capital (Lockheed et al. 1980; Stefanou and Saxena, 1988). This is 
also important for the CEECs as the level of formal education and training held by small-scale 
farmers in the region tends to be low.  
Regarding structural issues, at the beginning of the transition process the most common view was 
the strong belief that once the centrally planned system had been dismantled farm structures 
would go back to their ‘normal’ trajectory, namely smaller individual/family type farms (Csaki 
and Lerman, 1996). On economic grounds, this assumption has been based on the view that 
family farms are more efficient than co-operatives and other types of corporate farms (Schmitt, 
1991). In addition, the predominance of the family farms in developed market economies gave an 
easy example to promote the idea that the chances of the associative type of production in 
agriculture surviving under market conditions was low (Schmitt, 1993).  From a political 
economy perspective Christiaensen and Swinnen (1994) point out that historically the process of 
the development of family farms in the EU was not the one of self-organisation only, but it was 
strongly shaped by policy.  The family farms were not considered as the best structure for 
organising agricultural production per se, but rather they became “a political goal in itself” 
(Christiaensen and Swinnen, 1994). 
There is, thus, a lack of conclusive a priori arguments to claim that there is a superiority of 
individual over corporate type of farming or of small over larger farms.  The results of previous 
studies on farm structures and productivity show that the evidence is far from clear cut. In 
Hungary, when other factors are controlled for, family farms do appear to be more efficient, 
based on both Tornquvist - Theil TFP indices and DEA analysis (Hughes, 2000; Mathijs and 
Vranken, 2000) (Table 1). For the Czech Republic, both Hughes (1998) and Mathijs and Swinnen 
(2000) found that individual private farms were significantly more productive than corporate 
farms for livestock farming but not crop production. In Curtiss' (2000) analysis of crop 
production in the Czech Republic she found that co-operatives performed better for wheat and 
rapeseed cultivation compared to individual farms but that the latter were superior with regard to 
sugar beet production.  
For Poland Mech (1999) employing data for the whole country for 7 years concludes that there is 
some evidence of economies of scale with farms larger than 15 ha being more productive and 
profitable than the smaller ones.  Small farms record only higher land productivity, evidence 
consistent with the inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity observed in 
developing countries (Verma and Bromley, 1987). Van Zyl et al. analysed one point in time for 
two regions.  They conclude that there is a downward sloping curve for TFP (i.e. smaller farms 
were more productive).  However, using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) they show that there 
were not significant differences in scale efficiency between farms below and above 15 ha. 
Munroe (2000) employing stochastic frontier analysis found a negative relationship between farm 
size and efficiency (with farms greater than 15 ha exhibiting lower efficiency), but also found 




Comparatively analysing these results, it appears that arguments that co-operatives or other forms 
of corporate farming are inherently less efficient for all types of farming compared to family 
farms is misplaced. It appears that at least some corporate farms can solve the governance 
problems alluded to in the literature or that there are some types of farming for which such 
problems are less severe. 
Table 1: Empirical Studies of Farm Efficiency in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Country Author(s)  Dataset  Methodology  Comments 
Czech 
Republic 






Agrocensus and VUZE 
panel data for 1996 





Curtiss (2000)  VUZE FADN 1996-
1998 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA). 
 
Hungary  Hughes (2000)  AKII 1996-1997  Tornquvist - Theil TFP Index   
Hungary Mathijs  and 
Vranken 
(2000) 
1998 ACE survey  Data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). 
Crop and dairy 
farms 
Poland Munroe  (2001) 
 





Poland Mech  (1999)  1988-1994 
IERiGZ farm survey 
- Partial productivities-labour, 
land, capital.  
- TFP-Tornquist index. 
- Gross margin index by farm 





Poland  van Zyl et al. 
(1996) 






These productivity studies present some interesting findings but it is argued that further work is 
required on three counts. First, it is important to see if the trends identified for the early and mid-
1990s reflect short-term characteristics of restructuring or are more long-lasting phenomena. 
Second, from the efficiency studies it is possible to identify farms which are relatively more 
efficient (e.g. on the production frontier or with a higher TFP index score) in a particular sample. 
However, this says nothing about profitability and returns on resources employed in agriculture 
which will guide further restructuring in the sector. With the exception of Mech (1999), the other 
studies did not cover the issue of farm profitability.  Finally, previous studies have focused 
principally on the farm size, structure and efficiency debate. The performance of farms is shaped 
by many other factors than just size and ownership type, such as agri-environmental region, 
financial and managerial characteristics. These points guided the profitability, productivity and 





Farm profitability is analysed through the estimation of ratios between the costs and revenues for 
each farm. Farm profitability is mainly analysed with reference to a private cost benefit ratio 
(P_CB). For the i'th farm, the P_CB is taken to be: 
(1)  ( )
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where C
t
i is the cost of tradable inputs, C
f
i is the cost of non-tradable factors of production (based 
on private prices or estimates for non-paid land and labour input)  and Ri is revenue excluding 
current subsidies net of taxes. The initial data did not include a notional rent for owned land and 
wages for non-paid labour input. As all factors should bring returns at opportunity costs, for non-
paid land and labour input a set of shadow prices were estimated using regional averages.  Family 
labour was valued using the average regional farm unit labour costs.  As far as land was 
concerned, if a farm had a mix of rented and owned land, the rent paid was imputed to the owned 
land, as it was assumed that rented and own land were in close proximity and, thus, were of a 
compatible quality.  If a farm did not rent land, then the average regional rent was applied to the 
owned land. 
Two other profitability ratios were also calculated.  The first, cost-revenue plus subsidies (C_Rs), 
exactly matches the entries in the EU's Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) and, therefore, 
C
f
I  does not include estimates for non-paid labour and land and Ri  includes the budgetary 
transfers.  The second one, cost-revenue without subsidies (C_R), does not include estimates for 
non-paid labour and land and also excludes direct budgetary transfers.  The rationale for 
calculating these three different ratios is to give an insight into the effect of the direct budgetary 
transfers and the valuation of all factors at opportunity costs on different farm types and farms 
located in different agri-environmental regions.  As the approach is a static one, little however 
can be said about future adjustments to policy changes that might involve a removal of 
production related budgetary transfers. 
Productivity differences were estimated by the construction of a Tornquist-Theil TFP index for 
all farms in the sample relative to a base case ‘average farm’ with results interpreted relative to 
the sample mean, showing cohorts as having above or below average TFP scores. The Tornquist-
Theil TFP index is recognised as a measure of technical efficiency and to be an acceptable 
alternative to econometric estimation in cases where the data does not permit an underlying 
production function to be estimated (Capalbo and Antle, 1988).  
Cluster analysis has been chosen due to its strengths to define groups of objects, or farms in our 
case, with the maximum homogeneity within the groups while having maximum heterogeneity 
between the groups (Hair et al., 1998).  First, factor analysis was applied. Important variables 
considered in the factor analysis included measures of size: total labour (AWU), total output 
including the net current subsidies (OUTTOT), total assets (TOTASSET), and the utilised 
agricultural area (UAA). A variable to account for specialisation of the farm in arable farming 
(PROCRO) was included. Also two measures of the degree of intensification were included. The 
first one is the amount of land per annual work unit (LANDAWU): with larger scores indicating 
lower levels of intensification. The second one is the quantity of depreciation per annual work 
unit (DEPAWU), in which case higher values are used as proxies that there is more capital per 




were also considered: total net current subsidies (SUBNET) and the percentage of revenue 
derived from direct subsidies (SUBOUTP). Two variables to account for the use of paid primary 
factors, the percentage of rented land (PORREUAA) and the percentage of paid labour 
(PORPALAB), were included alongside standard financial ratios (DEBTOAS, LEVERAGE).   
The method of principal component analysis with varimax rotation has been adopted. The cut-off 
applied for interpretation purposes were factor loadings greater or equal to 0.5 on at least one 
factor.  Two tests have been applied to assess the validity of each factor analysis. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkim measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. The factors formed 
the basis of the cluster analysis, following a two-stage approach. First, a hierarchical technique 
was used to identify outliers, the number of clusters and profile the cluster centres. Then, the 
observations were clustered by a non-hierarchical method with the cluster centres from the 
hierarchical results as the initial seed points. This combined procedure allows one to benefit from 
the advantages associated with hierarchical and non-hierarchical methods, while at the same time 
minimising the drawbacks (Punj and Stewart, 1983). The algorithm used in the hierarchical 
technique was Ward’s method based on squared Euclidean distances. To decide how many 
clusters exist, criteria suggested by Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1993) were applied.  
4 Data  sets 
Data was extracted from FADN surveys, which are implemented in all EU Member-States and 
some of the EU candidate countries. FADN is biased towards  larger commercial holdings.   
Studying larger farms and excluding the purely subsistence ones is adequate for the present 
research as the very smallest 'farms' are likely to continue to produce for self-consumption and to 
be less integrated into the market even after EU accession (Kostov and Lingard, 2002).  Poland 
has to date not introduced the FADN system. The Polish Institute of Agricultural and Food 
Economics (IERiGZ)
3 carries out an annual farm survey that has been used as the main source of 
data. Table 2 sets out the main characteristics of the datasets used in the analysis. 






No. of  records used 
in cluster analysis 
(outliers excluded) 
Comments 
Czech Republic  1998-9  FADN    823    812  
Hungary 2000  FADN  1,121 1,112  
Poland  1999  IERiGZ  1,001    979 Only individual farms 
Spain  1996-9  FADN     369    369  
S.E. England  1999  FBS  183 183 FBS consistent with FADN.  
* For comparative purposes the presentation of Czech and Spanish results in this paper concentrates on data from 
1999. 
Finally, regarding the data available, one should note some caveats.  The cross-national 
comparisons face the problem of differences in data collection procedures between countries. 
While most associated countries are harmonising their own surveys with the EU's FADN, this is 
still an on-going process. It is, therefore, difficult to exactly compare farm performance amongst 
the CEECs and against current EU member states. Rather cross-national comparisons give a 
flavour of the main characteristics of commercial agriculture in three CEECs and how this differs 
from two contrasting EU regions.  
                                                 




5  Basic farm characteristics: a comparative picture 
Table 3 presents an overview of the sample farms.
4  The table shows that according to the four 
size measures (average UAA per farm, average output, total assets and labour input) the countries 
fall into three groups. These three groups are: the largest farms (the Czech Republic), medium 
size farms (Hungary and S.E. England, although measured by assets, the S.E. English farms are 
the largest) and small farms (Poland and Navarra).   
Table 3: Background Sample Characteristics, 1999
1 
   Czech R  Hungary  Poland  Navarra 
Spain 
S.E. England 
Average UAA per farm (ha)  658 202 25 50 141
Average output
2 (EUR)  532,665 224,073 18,000 97,000 399,753 
Average total assets (EUR)  870,542 204,484 86,000 292,000 1,345,154 
Average total assets per ha (EUR)  1,450 1,977 3,440 5,840 9,540
Land rented (%)  76 42 17 45 34
Hired labour input (%)   50 31 6 10  53
Land per AWU (ha)  38 53 13 36  41
DEPAWU (EUR)  2,421 2,427 1,294 6,281 7,810 
Average AWU per farm  32 7.45 1.85 1.49  6.35
Average paid wage (EUR per paid AWU)  3,552 3,490 2,308 12,312  18,790
1 For Hungary 2000. 
2 Output includes net current subsidies. 
The main differences amongst the CEECs in farm size stem from the existence, or the lack of, 
corporate farms. Although corporate farms are widespread in both the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, there is a considerable difference between the two countries.  The land area available to 
successor farms in Hungary decreased substantially during transition as a result of the adopted 
procedures of land reform and farm restructuring, especially because a large area of land had to 
be set aside for compensation purposes under the Compensation Act.  Thus, although in the 
Hungarian FADN sample there were 235 corporate farms, 55 per cent of them were below 300 
ha.  In the Czech Republic the FADN sample included 310 corporate farms split up according to 
the legal form into limited liability companies, joint-stock companies and co-operatives. The 
average size of each of these legal forms was above 1,000 ha.  In addition, in comparison to 
Hungary, corporate farms use a much higher share of UAA in the Czech Republic.  These 
differences are reflected in the larger average area, output and assets per farm in the Czech 
Republic than in Hungary. 
The Polish farms are the smallest by all size measures. However, according to size they appear 
closer to farms in the EU (Navarra, Spain) than their counterparts in the Czech Republic.  When 
assets are measured per ha, then the Polish farmers seem to be much better capitalised than farms 
in the Czech Republic or Hungary.  This results from their longer history of independent farming. 
Not surprisingly, S.E. England has the most capitalised farms, having assets per ha more than 60 
per cent higher than in Navarra and nearly three times that of Poland.   
The differences amongst the countries in using the land rental and labour markets are striking.  
The Polish farms rely almost entirely on their own resources.  Only 6 per cent of labour input is 
                                                 
4 It has to be noted that these averages include the usable records only.  As during the cluster analysis some outliers 
were removed, there might be slight differences between the averages in the table below and the means shown in the 




accounted for by hired labour and only 17 per cent of total land is rented.  Thus, they are 
dependent on the initial family endowment of resources and familial human capital.  This lack of 
integration into factor markets is one of the clear signs of the peasant character of the Polish 
agriculture.  Farms in Navarra, most of which are located in marginal areas (LFAs or objective 
5b), also rely on own labour but they do rent land in order to achieve a reasonable size, which can 
provide an acceptable income. Poland however appears to present a clear structural problem: 
there are too many people farming on too small land areas.  Family farms in Navarra have three 
times as much land per AWU than in Poland.  The Czech Republic and Hungary, due to their 
corporate farms which depend almost fully on rented land and hired labour, are nearer to the 
English case of large family farms in terms of the extensive use of land rental and labour markets. 
Another striking difference is the pay of hired labour.  In this case the clear divide is between the 
EU member states and the accession countries.  Although theoretically accession may accelerate 
the equalisation of product and factor prices, the order of magnitude of the differences in 
agricultural wages is such that most probably a large gap will persist for a long time post-
accession.  This may continue to induce incentives for agricultural labour from the CEECs to 
move to work, at least seasonally, in West European farms, a phenomenon that is currently in 
place.  
6 Farm  profitability 
The differences in farm structural characteristics bring about important consequences for the 
profitability of farming.  Table 4 presents the average farm profitability for the sample farms in 
each of the analysed countries according to the three profitability ratios. 
Table 4: Profitability Ratios 




Average P_CB score  1.224  1.03  3.83  1.098  1.374 
% of sample profitable on P_CB  20  60.9  8.7  45.0  14.8 
Average C_R score  1.086  0.81  1.01  0.714  1.095 
% of sample profitable on C_R   38  81.5  60.4  85.4  42.6 
Average C_Rs score  1.003  0.76  1.01  0.604  0.922 
% of sample profitable on C_Rs   48  85.4  60.4  92.7  74.9 
The P_CB ratio is sensitive to the shadow prices applied to non-paid labour and own land.  This 
is particularly important for individual farms that mainly rely on own resources. However, as 
shown in Table 69, even in regions where farming uses mainly own resources, as in Navarra, if 
the resources are effectively used, farms can be near the break-even point according to the P_CB 
ratio. 
The most profitable farms are in Navarra and Hungary.  The fact that in this group there is one 
EU member state and one transition country tends to undermine any easy generalisations. The 
profitability of farms in Navarra cannot be solely attributed to CAP headage and acreage 
payments and transfers received because of their location in LFAs or objective 5b areas.  It is true 
that direct payments account for 13.6 per cent of the gross output of Navarra’s farms and that 
almost all sample farms receive direct payments (Table 5). However, the importance of direct 
payments in S. E. England is not substantially different but the English farms are unprofitable on 




The Hungarian farms have the best prospects amongst analysed accession countries according to 
their profitability.  They are near the break-even point on the P_CB ratio and are profitable 
according to the other two ratios (Table 4).  They achieve this profitability with more modest 
direct payments than the EU members.  The net current subsidies account for slightly above 5 per 
cent of the gross output (Table 5).     
Table 5: Direct Payments 
 Czech  R  Hungary  Poland  Spain  S.E. 
England 
Direct payments as % of gross output  6.4  5.2  0.0003  13.6  14.0 
% of sample which receive direct payments  80  82  1.9  99.2  72.1 
For the Czech Republic and Poland profitability is a big problem is agriculture.  The average 
scores according to the three ratios are above 1. Even without accounting for the opportunity 
costs of own resources and adding up the direct payments, 52 per cent of the sample farms in the 
Czech Republic and 40 per cent in Poland are unprofitable.  Whilst Polish farmers do not benefit 
from direct payments, the Czech farms receive more net current subsidies in relative terms than 
the Hungarian farmers, but nevertheless their private profitability is low.   The comparison of the 
average profitability scores by legal form for the Czech Republic and Hungary (Table 6) reveals 
that the Czech farms are uniformly loss making with the exception of individual farms on the 
C_Rs ratio.  Exactly the opposite is true for Hungary with only one ratio above 1, the P_CB 
measure for individual farms.  Production co-operatives appear to be the most profitable 
management form in Hungary.   
Table 6: Profitability Ratios for Czech and Hungarian Samples according to Management Type 

















 Hungary  Czech  Republic 
 P_CB  
average 1.0889  0.8637  0.7840 0.9316 1.2623 1.2035 1.1944  1.1372 
 C_R average   0.8212  0.8559  0.7826 0.7933 1.0467 1.1932 1.1879  1.1297 
 C_Rs average  0.7686  0.7686  0.7455 0.7365 0.9544 1.0981 1.1302  1.0658 
The lack of profitability makes the long-term viability of a large number of Czech and Polish 
farms questionable unless they manage to restructure.  The issue is even more serious in the 
Czech Republic due to the high level of farm indebtedness (Table 7).  Czech farms are funded by 
debt and average debts are higher than the net worth of the farms (leverage above 1).  However, 
their financial stress (RENGO and RENGM) is not as high as would have been expected by the 
indebtedness figures, in fact it is less than in the two EU case study regions.  The poor financial 
situation of the Czech farms is mainly due to the non-bank liabilities of the successor farms either 
to individual owners of the assets for producer co-operatives or to the state for the limited 
liability companies.  As a result of the adopted reform legislation these farms did not need to 
repay these debts for several years after their establishment.
5  For this reason the financial stress 
is lower than it would have been under similar situations in the EU. 
                                                 
5 Limited liability companies are to a large extent successors of the former state farms. Their assets had to be 
purchased and the farmers had to pay an initial instalment while the rest was recorded as long-term liabilities to the 





Table 7: Financial Ratios for the Sample Farms 
 Czech  R  Hungary  Poland  Spain  S.E.  England 
Debt to assets  0.331  0.16  0.03  0.079  0.152 
Leverage 1.525  0.39  0.04  0.110  0.252 
RENGO 0.038  0.03  0.02  0.050  0.094 
RENGM   0.085  0.04  0.04  0.121  0.355 
Polish farmers do not rely on external financing either due to external constraints (access to 
credit) or internal choice (not applying for loans).  Similarly to land and labour, they rely on 
internal resources and this is one of the main reasons for the slow rate of farm restructuring and 
the persistence of small-scale, semi-subsistence agriculture.   
7 Total  factor  productivity 
TFP scores are expressed in relation to the sample mean that has been normalised to unity.  While 
one is able to identify farms which are relatively more efficient with a higher TFP index score in 
a particular sample for one country, this might bear little relationship to what might be considered 
to be internationally productive.  Therefore, what it is possible to compare internationally is the 
share of farms that have high TFP scores in the sample and whether they produce the 
predominant portion of output and to what extent they depend on net current subsidies.  The 
ranking of productivity scores between the different management types can also be compared.  
Table 8 presents the country results according to TFP with estimated costs for own resources. 
Table 8: Farm Productivity (TFP scores) 
   Czech R  Hungary  Poland  Spain  S-E England 
No of high productivity farms (TFP>1)  381 488 346 106 86
% of high productivity farms  46 44 35 29 47
% of sample UAA in TFP>1farms  53 64 63 29 38
% of sample output in TFP>1 farms
1  60 85 56 37 69
% of sample subsidies to TFP>1 farms  46 49 52 33 26
1 Output includes net current subsidies. 
Overall, in all countries farms with TFP scores above 1 are a minority and at the extreme in 
Navarra constitute only 29 per cent of the sample farms.  Two important features stem from the 
productivity analysis.  With the exception of Spain, the minority of productive farms (between 
two-thirds and four-fifths) produces a majority of the total output.  From this point of view once 
again Hungary has the best performance with 85 per cent of the output produced in farms having 
technically efficient input-output combinations.  The other important conclusion, brought about 
by the S.E England farms, is that the productive farms might not rely heavily on net direct 
subsidies.  In S.E. England 47 per cent of productive farms absorb only 26 per cent of total net 
current subsidies. 
According to management type, the corporate farms have higher TFP scores than the individual 
farms (Table 9). 
Table 9: Farm Productivity by Legal Form (TFP scores) 
Hungary Czech  Republic 
Legal type  Average score  Legal type  Average score 
Family farms  0.96  Family farms  0.987 




Co-operatives 1.19  Co-operatives  1.033 
Joint ventures  1.42  Joint Stock companies  1.035 
Other 0.96  Other N/A 
Family farms are less productive despite the high expectations at the outset of the reform process 
that better incentives involved in individual farming would boost their efficiency.  The reasons 
for this result are complex, including the long-standing tradition of farming in association in these 
countries, a high share of hired labour in corporate farms allowing them to recruit labour with 
necessary skills for technical agricultural and management positions. In some cases, former 
collective farm managers were able to siphon off the most attractive parts of the business into 
new corporate farms that yield good returns.  The argument that corporate farms benefit solely 
from economies of size does not seem to hold, at least for Hungary.  Even when size is controlled 
for, individual farms still appear as less productive than their corporate counterparts. 
The profitability and productivity comparisons identify the broad differences between countries, 
but there are also considerable variations in farm performance within countries. To capture these 
variations, factor and cluster analysis have been employed and discussed in detail in the country 
sections. Here for each country the best and the worst performing clusters are presented in an 
attempt to draw some more general conclusions.    
8 Cluster  analysis 
In order to describe whether there are common characteristics, the most and the least profitable 
farm clusters in different countries are compared. Consequently, farms are characterised 
according to their size, specialisation, reliance on own or external resources, and dependence on 
subsidies.  
According to size, farms are classified as small or large in relation to the sample averages.  When 
these farms are the largest or smallest in the sample this is clearly indicated.  The qualifications 
‘very small’ or ‘very large’ are used in cases when the size of the farms in the particular cluster 
differ several fold from the sample average.  By the same token, when the variation is only 
slightly above or below the average this is also explicitly indicated.  The same logic has been 
followed for other farm characteristics, such as specialisation, intensification, dependence on 
rented resources and net current subsidies, and financial situation.  To the extent that for Poland, 
Navarra and S.E. England individual farms predominate or are solely present, management form 
is only indicated for the Czech Republic and Hungary.  The net current subsidies for Poland have 
been ignored, as they are negligible. 
 Table 10: Comparison of the Most Profitable Cluster from Each Country by C_Rs Ratio  
 Czech  R  Hungary Poland Navarra S.E.England 
N FARMS  229 319 19 80 61 
UAA 164  35 66 74 126 
AWU 4.74  1.26 3.05 1.77 3.19 
OUTTOT 115,789  30,991 38,598 18,204 160,764 
TOTASSET 213,955  39,889 160,505 55,546 1,594,295 
PROCRO 0.762  0.59 0.38 0.902 0.245 
DEBTOAS 0.192  0.11 0.06 0.046 0.085 
LEVERAGE 0.5  0.17 0.07 0.053 0.107 
LANDAWU 51  31 17 43 47 




PORREUAA 0.68  0.29 0.11 0.32 0.16 
PORPALAB 0.28  0.02 0.15 0.29 0.44 
SUBSOUTP 0.032  0.06 0.0076 0.147 0.154 
SUBSNET 415  2,050 196 2,214 27,380 
    
VADAWU 8,323  3,215 7,524 21,795 
TFP 1.026  1.02 1.16 1.370 0.954 
PC_B   1.157  1.02 2.35 0.924 1.423 
C_R   0.992  0.70 0.94 0.523 1.054 
C_Rs   0.958  0.65 0.93 0.429 0.876 
Table 10a: Comparison of the Most Profitable Cluster from Each Country by C_Rs Ratio 
 Czech  R  Hungary  Poland  Navarra  S.E.England 
UAA Small  Very  small  Large  Large  Small 
AWU Small  Very  small  Large  Large  Small 
Assets Small  Very  small  Large  Large  Large 
Management form  Individual  Individual  Na  Na  Na 
Specialisation Crops  Mixed  Livestock  Crop  Livestock 
Land per AWU  Large  Small  Large  Large  Large 
Capital per AWU  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large 
Rented land  Small  Small  High  Small  Small 
Hired labour  Small  Negligible  High  Large  Small 
External debts 
(DEBTOAS) 
Small Small  High  Small  Small 
Reliance on subsidies  Low  Slightly  above  
average 
Na Slightly  above   
average 







Table 11: Comparison of the Most Profitable Cluster from Each Country by P_CB Ratio 
  Czech R  Hungary   Poland  
Navarra (same 
as above   S.E. England  
N FARMS  111  47 67 80  11 
UAA  1,510.52 2,154 53 74  173 
AWU  78 97 1.36 1.77  26.91 
OUTTOT  1,312,198 2,998,619 26,555 18,204  874,177 
TOTASSET  2,079,612 2,449,415 147,745 55,546 2,493,648 
PROCRO  0.502 0.63 0.91 0.902  0.731 
DEBTOAS  0.632 0.40 0.04 0.046  0.151 
LEVERAGE  -0.118 1.11 0.05 0.053  0.221 
LANDAWU  23 24 36 43 13 
DEPAWU  1,966 1,303 3,465 756 3,821 
PORREUAA  0.97 0.95 0.14 0.32 0.57 
PORPALAB  1.00 1.00 0.13 0.29 0.93 
SUBSOUTP  0.051 0.05 0 0.147  0.021 
SUBSNET  5,484 119,433 0 2,214  15,768 
      




TFP 1.039  1.35 2.15 1.370  1.287 
PC_B   1.119  0.73 1.11 0.924  1.033 
C_R   1.11  0.72 1.18 0.523  0.994 
C_Rs   1.048  0.69 1.18 0.429  0.969 
 
Table 11a: Comparison of the Most Profitable Cluster from Each Country by P_CB Ratio 
  Czech R   Hungary   Poland   Navarra  S.E. England  
UAA Very  large  Largest  Large  Large  Large 
AWU Very  large  Largest  Small  Large  Largest 
Assets Very  large  Largest  Large  Large  The  largest 
Management form  Co-operatives  Corporate  Na  Na  Na 
Specialisation Mixed  Mixed  Crop  Crop  Crop 
Land per AWU  Small  Small  Large  Large  Small 
Capital per AWU  Small  Small  Large  Small  Small 
Rented land  Almost all  Almost all  Small  Small  Large 
Hired labour  Almost all  All  Large  Large  Almost all 
External debts 
(DEBTOAS) 
Large Large  Above 
average 










From Tables 10 and 10a it is can be seen that the individual farms are the most profitable in 
relation to C_Rs.  This is true also for the Czech Republic and Hungary where there is a mix 
between individual and corporate farms.  In countries where the sample average of farms size is 
large (the Czech Republic, Hungary and S.E.England), the most profitable are the relatively small 
farms and in fact in Hungary the smallest one.  This is in contrast to countries with a small mean 
farm size (Poland and Navarra).  The profitable farms have a large land area per unit of labour 
and rely predominantly on own resources.  The exception to this is Poland, but as in Poland on 
average the sample farms rely almost solely on own resources, farms that have some higher than 
the average involvement in land, labour or credit markets appear with a high reliance on external 
resources.    
 
Table 12: Comparison of the Least Profitable Cluster from Each Country by P_CB ratio 
  Czech R   Hungary   Poland   Navarra  S.E. England  
N FARMS  40  56 79 40 35 
UAA  553 558 17 67 136 
AWU  22.19 6.92 1.72 1.23 2.97 
OUTTOT  317,571 218,843 8,646 10,677 142,468 
TOTASSET  640,917 251,218 56,673 35,695 635,614 
PROCRO  0.357 0.83 0.4 0.449 0.155 
DEBTOAS  0.386 0.34 0.01 0.083 0.171 
LEVERAGE  -3.242 1.30 0.01 0.100 0.235 
LANDAWU  43 184 9 54 52 
DEPAWU  2,300 6,814 889 1,143 7,008 
PORREUAA  0.839 0.81 0.14 0.73 0.80 
PORPALAB  0.47 0.52 0.03 0.009 0.35 
SUBSOUTP  0.248 0.10 0 0.255 0.205 




        
VADAWU 5,585  3,078 22,794 
TFP 0.764  0.82 0.63 0.636 0.87 
RC_B   1.563  1.24 5.94 1.528 1.541 
C_R   1.363  1.13 1.14 1.025 1.212 
C_Rs   0.966  1.00 1.14 0.751 0.946 
Table 12a: Comparison of the Least Profitable Cluster from Each Country by P_CB ratio 
 
Czech R  Hungary   Poland   Navarra 
S.E. 
England  
UAA  Smaller than average  Large  Small  Large  At average 
AWU Smaller  than  average  Small Small  Smallest  Small 
Assets Smaller  than  average  Large Smallest  Smallest  Small 
Management form  All types  All types  Na  Na  Na 
Specialisation Livestock  Crop  Mixed  Mixed  Livestock 
Land per AWU  Large  Very large  Small  Large  Large 
Capital per AWU  At average  Very large  Small  Above average  At average 
Rented land  Large  Large  Below 
average 
Large Large 
Hired labour  Near the average  Large  Negligible  Negligible  Small 
External debts 
(DEBTOAS) 
Higher than average  Above 
average 




Very large  Very large  Na  Very large  Large 
Comments  Farms situated in the 
worst agri-env region 
      
 
The picture alters dramatically when the P_CB ratio is applied.  In order to receive returns on 
own resources at opportunity costs and to survive without direct payments, farms have to be 
large. On two occasions these are the largest in the country (Tables 11 and 11a).  The best 
performing farms rely heavily on external resources, including loans.  Thus, the development of 
land rental, labour and credit markets is an important precondition for farms to be profitable 
without direct payments.  In Poland, Navarra and S.E.England where farms are family run, 
specialisation in crop production helps profitability.  In Hungary and the Czech Republic the best 
performing farms are the corporate farms as the valuation of own resources does not affect their 
costs.  In these cases the specialisation does not appear to be important. 
The least profitable farms according to P_CB ratio are small, predominantly livestock or mixed 
units (Tables 12 and 12a).  The main feature of these farms is their high dependence on subsidies.  
These are farms that potentially cannot survive under a liberal CAP. 
9 Conclusions 
Research on farm restructuring in the CEECs in the early 1990s largely analysed farm 
performance through recourse to a dichotomy of collectivised and individual farming. The 1990s 
have witnessed extensive restructuring that has created a more complex pattern of farming. This 
suggests that the assessment of farm fortunes in CEECs cannot be reduced to merely a discussion 
of legal forms. The analysis of farm level profitability and productivity in three CEECs provides 
results supporting the view that by the end of 1990s there is no strong evidence that family farms 
perform better than the corporate type of farming.  The small family farms are successful if they 




(C_Rs ratio).  However, when the opportunity costs for own labour and land are accounted for 
and farms operate without current subsidies (P_CB ratio) the most profitable are large farms. In 
countries where there are corporate farms, as in the Czech Republic and Hungary, the best 
performers are either producer co-operatives or a mix of co-operatives and other farming 
companies. The most profitable according to the P_CB ratio are farms that do not heavily rely on 
subsidies.  They create a core of farms that are not strongly dependent on policy protection and 
potentially could survive without direct payments. 
One striking feature of the analysis is the current poor state of Polish agriculture. Just less than 40 
per cent of farms are loss making when only paid inputs are considered. The returns on own 
labour and lands are exceptionally low and the majority of individual farms persist through a lack 
of other employment options and a degree of self-exploitation.  These figures on poor private 
profitability mirror the findings of research on the international competitiveness of Polish 
agriculture. Gorton et al. (2001) found that for eight main commodity groups (wheat, rye, sugar 
beet, rapeseed, potatoes, milk, beef and pork), small farms in Poland (defined as between 3 and 
10 hectares) were international competitive only for potatoes and this was very marginal. For 
farms above 10 hectares, the situation was slightly better (rapeseed and potato production were 
estimated as being profitable at international prices) but for all livestock and most crop output, 
production was deeply uncompetitive. The low private profitability of agriculture in Poland is 
therefore not the result of the sector being effectively taxed by the state, as in some other CEECs 
e.g. Bulgaria in the early 1990s (Ivanova et al. 1995) and in fact relative protection is high by 
CEEC standards (OECD, 2000). Rather the low private profitability and international 
competitiveness is the result of structural problems. Whilst direct payments could improve the 
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